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and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post–Cold War Era
How do nongovernmental (NGO), international (IO), 
and military organizations cope with their dependencies 
and address their perceptual and real diff erences in 
order to coordinate their fi eld operations? Th is question 
is addressed through the creation of a matrix grouping 
civilian (NGOs and IOs) and military operations into 
four general types: peacekeeping; disaster relief; complex 
humanitarian emergencies/warfare; and stabilization 
and reconstruction. Second, using Galbraith’s 
information processing approach to organizational 
design, a range of formal coordination mechanisms 
that organizations use at the strategic and operational 
levels to help them cope with their dependencies in 
diff erent fi eld operations is identifi ed. Th ird, the author 
underscores how communities of practice are emerging 
as informal mechanisms of coordination among civilian 
and military organizations. And fi nally, a framework of 
organizational forms that views communities of practice 
as an alternative to hierarchy and markets is off ered. 
Believing communities of practice hold the most promise 
for coordination in the human security domain when 
hierarchies are politically untenable and markets lack 
accountability, the author concludes with implications for 
interorganization coordination research and practice.
Over the past two decades, one of the most challenging developments for civilian-military (civ-mil) relations around the 
world has been fi nding ways to work together. Th e 
transformation of warfare in 
the post–Cold War era and 
the military’s expansion into 
“operations other than war”—
into “nonkinetic” or nonviolent 
facets of operations—continues 
to fuel confl icts between civilian 
and military organizations. 
It also has diminished the 
eff ectiveness of co-located and 
interdependent operations of 
both communities worldwide. 
Th e late Sergio Vieira de Mello, 
former undersecretary-general 
and emergency relief coordinator for the United 
Nations, summarized the dilemma in a brief to the 
UN Security Council in 1999:
Contemporary armed confl ict is seldom con-
ducted on a clearly defi ned battlefi eld, by con-
ventional armies confronting each other. Today’s 
warfare often takes place in cities and villages, 
with civilians as the preferred targets, the propa-
gation of terror as the premeditated tactic, and 
the physical elimination or mass displacement 
of certain categories of populations as the over-
arching strategy. Th e acts of warring parties in 
recent confl icts in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leone, and Afghanistan bear testimony to this. 
Breaches of human rights and humanitarian 
law, including mutilation, rape, forced displace-
ment, denial of the right to food and medicines, 
diversion of aid, and attacks on medical person-
nel and hospitals are no longer inevitable by 
products of war. Th ey have become the means 
to achieve a strategic goal. As a result, even low-
intensity confl icts generate enormous human 
suff ering. Humanitarian needs are dispropor-
tionate to the scale of military confl ict. Meeting 
these needs has become more diffi  cult, as the 
dividing line between soldiers and civilians has 
grown blurred. (Vieira de Mello 1999)
How do military and civilian 
organizations cope with their 
interdependencies in the 
human security domain as the 
boundaries between them have 
blurred? What mechanisms 
exist to coordinate fi eld 
activities and overcome the 
perceptual and real diff erences 
between the two communities? 
Public administration 
researchers have been largely 
silent on these questions, 
despite their import and 
How do military and civilian 
organizations cope with their 
interdependencies in the 
human security domain as the 
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relevance. Th us, this essay has a threefold purpose. First, it alerts 
PAR readers—as citizens, practitioners, and researchers—to the 
sources of tensions that have arisen between military and civilian 
organizations in the post–Cold War era. It then off ers a four-part 
typology of civ-mil operations based on the level of threat (Crocker, 
Hampson, and Aall 2001) and the level of domain consensus. Next, 
building on Galbraith’s (1973) information-processing approach 
to organizational design, the article identifi es a range of formal and 
informal interorganizational cooperation (IOC) mechanisms used 
in civ-mil operations, each with its own constraints and limitations. 
Th e article concludes by off ering a research agenda for fi lling the 
conspicuous public administration gap in studying the civ-mil nexus 
in the twenty-fi rst century.
The Civilian-Military Conundrum in the 
Post–Cold War Era
One of the most striking developments in contemporary warfare 
is how the dividing line between soldiers and civilians has blurred. 
Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid made the point when he 
claimed there was no distinction between civilian and military 
personnel when justifying the Taliban’s attacking and killing of 
International Rescue Committee workers in Logar, Afghanistan. 
Th ey were the “foreign invader forces.” Th ey were “not working for 
the interests of Afghanistan and they belonged to those countries 
whose forces . . . took Afghanistan’s freedom” (BBC News 2008). 
Such incidents are expected to increase in the future, not only in 
Afghanistan but in other confl ict areas as well. Poorly delimited 
boundaries between military forces and civilians, as recent events 
in Gaza illustrate, make urban warfare particularly destructive 
(Elkington 2009).
Insisting on guidelines to separate civilians and combatants when 
the nature of combat and adversaries make those boundaries 
obsolete is unlikely to produce successful outcomes for either 
civilians or the military. Civilian and military organizations are 
being thrown by mission and mandate into interdependencies. Both 
operate in the domain of human security, framed from a military 
perspective as freedom from personal attacks and violence, and from 
a civilian perspective as providing both emergency and long-term 
basic needs of life such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and 
employment. Both are co-located and interdependent in threatening 
environments and confront very challenging problems—
peacekeeping, disaster relief, postconfl ict reconstruction, and 
warfare. Civilians need the military to provide information about 
the terrain, operations, and aff ected populations, and in high-threat 
conditions, they often rely on military transportation and logistics. 
Th e military needs civilians for humanitarian assistance and for their 
knowledge and expertise in the reconstruction and development of 
devastated areas.
Lesson 1: While military and civilian organizations increasingly 
are co-located and need each other to deal eff ectively with theater 
challenges, diff erences in cultures, organizational structures, 
beliefs, and priorities have made eff ective coordination 
challenging.
Better coordination between military and civilian organizations is 
needed to protect human life; however, diff erences in philosophies 
and operating procedures have made civ-mil relations diffi  cult 
during fi eld-based operations (Sommers 2000; Whelan and 
Harmer 2006). Although all members share a “commitment to 
service, a willingness to work among the dead and dying, and 
also an acceptance of signifi cant risk in their daily lives,” their 
organizational characteristics are “profoundly diff erent” (Seiple 
1996, v) in terms of cultures, structural features, and behavior 
(Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss 2000; Frandsen 2002; James 2003; 
Seiple 1996). Civilian organizations, especially nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), believe that human suff ering should be 
relieved without regard for nationality, political or ideological 
beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity. Th ey attempt to fulfi ll their 
mandates by being autonomous, neutral, and impartial. In general, 
they resist taking instructions from those outside their organizations 
and eye with suspicion any attempts to organize or integrate with 
others, lest they compromise their freedom of operation. Th eir 
organizational designs typically depend on a decentralized authority 
structure, enabling them to focus on fi eld-level operations to quickly 
adapt to austere conditions. Th ey tend to assemble on an as-needed 
basis and execute on the fl y. Th ey strive toward transparency, 
accountability, and consensus-based decision making rather than 
directives from headquarters.
Military organizations operate on a diff erent rationale. Th eir 
organizational designs reinforce hierarchical authority, clear lines 
of command and control, and explicit rules of engagement to 
ensure accountability to policy makers. Th eir general mandate 
is to establish and maintain public order and ensure operational 
security and force protection. Th us, they are less inclined to share 
information to protect operational security. Clear delineations of 
roles, responsibilities, and unity of command are viewed as necessary 
for mission success. Th ey pride themselves on advanced planning 
and systematic execution of operational orders and seek a positive 
public image.
Coordinating costs tend to be higher for civilian organizations 
compared to those of the military. In general, civilians believe that 
close alignment with the military in political disputes or political 
positions compromises their principles of humanity, impartiality, 
and neutrality (IASC 2004; Phelan and Wood 2005). Th eir fear is 
that if they are viewed as partial, their members will be prevented 
from gaining access to vulnerable populations, exposed to greater 
risks when in the fi eld, and even targeted by combatants (Dziedzic 
and Seidl 2005; IASC 2004). Th is perception has been reinforced 
by recent attacks against the United Nations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and by the assassination of Margaret Hassan, director of 
Care International’s operations in Iraq (Tomb 2005). Th us, their 
objective is to maintain a clear distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants and refrain from presenting themselves as part of a 
military operation.
Interaction potential between the military and civilians also is 
limited because of their mutual suspicions. Th ese derive from 
a host of factors, such as a perceived lack of common goals and 
values between the military and civilian organizations, as well 
as the absence of a common task-related language for discourse. 
Frandsen illustrates the point in terms of military-NGO relations: 
“NGO personnel have many feelings about the military: general 
disdain, nervousness (around weapons, camoufl age, saluting, the 
‘hoo-ah’ attitudes), ignorance (which often leads to nervousness or 
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disdain), previous bad experience (Kent State 
University, Somalia, etc.) or philosophical 
opposition” (2002, 140). Moreover, as Ford, 
Hogan, and Perry write, NGOs sometimes 
“perceive the military as responsible for the 
destruction of homes, crops and livestock and 
guilty of serious off enses such as rape, torture, 
genocide and violations of human rights. 
And when the confl ict does end, they see the 
military leaving behind unexploded ordnance 
and landmines that cause long-term human 
damage” (2002, 12).
Th e military, in turn, directs “a slew of . . . 
verbiage aimed at NGO ineffi  ciencies, 
whimsical patterns, media hunger and lack of absolute independent 
logical capabilities” (Frandsen 2002, 140). Likewise, Ford, Hogan, 
and Perry note that “[f ]rom the military side, NGOs are often 
viewed as diffi  cult to work with. . . . Th ey want support yet they 
demand autonomy. NGOs will not respond to orders given by 
the military even if their personal safety is at stake” (2002, 12). 
And they “will openly criticize the military, while at the same time 
request logistics, communications and transportation support from 
those same military forces” (Ford, Hogan, and Perry 2002, 13).
Civilian-Military Operations: An Analytical Perspective
Despite these real and perceived diff erences, as well as the often 
constrained and inhibited coordination that characterizes the 
human security domain, a review of the organizational theory 
literature confi rms that not all civ-mil interaction needs to be 
addressed in the same way. Yet it also reveals that a key element 
of the civ-mil nexus is ignored by theorists and needs to be 
incorporated into our thinking: the level of the threat facing 
potential domain partners.
Lesson 2: In the civ-mil nexus, environmental threat interacts 
with domain consensus to create four analytically distinct 
categories of civ-mil operations that practitioners and researchers 
need to consider when crafting coordination mechanisms.
Various dimensions have been used by organizational theorists 
to characterize environments in terms of their technological, 
legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological, and cultural 
elements (Aldrich 1979; Hall 1999). In order to conduct their 
studies, theorists have reduced and simplifi ed these content areas 
into analytical dimensions, such as the level of munifi cence, 
complexity, and dynamism in a particular environment (Dess 
and Beard 1984; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). However, one 
dimension that is critical to the security domain is not addressed 
by organizational theorists: the level of threat to human life. 
Most researchers assume the existence of competitive forces, 
but not life-ending ones. Yet threat level is a central dimension 
in understanding the human security domain and the range of 
tasks and operations that are conducted within it. Th ese include 
intelligence, policing, justice and legal administration, emergency 
management, and national security.
Within the national security domain, civilians tend to focus 
on aff ected populations, while the military tends to focus on 
combatants. But, as suggested earlier, 
separating combatants from civilians 
becomes much more diffi  cult given recent 
changes in the nature of warfare (Hoehn 
et al. 2007; Van Creveld 1991). When 
this blurring occurs, not only are security 
risks heightened for all, including the 
populations that both are trying to protect, 
but blurred boundaries between civilian 
and military organizations prompt confl icts 
over what organizations have the “right” 
to be in which space, at which time, and 
for what purpose. Basically, they activate 
what researchers call domain confl icts. 
Domain consensus, a critical dimension in 
IOC research (Aldrich 1979; Aldrich and Marsden 1988), has 
been found to be a “necessary precondition” for organizations 
to coordinate (Alexander 1995). Th e converse also appears to 
be true: “when confl ict between organizations over their mutual 
domains is latent or open, the prospects for IOCs are low” 
(Alexander 1995, 20).
Combining these two factors—threat level and domain 
consensus—into a two-by-two matrix makes it possible to map 
civ-mil operations (see fi gure 1): peacekeeping (quadrant 1); disaster 
relief (quadrant 2); development and reconstruction, stabilization/ 
security/ transition/ reconstruction, peacebuilding, and nation-
building operations (quadrant 3); and complete humanitarian 
emergencies (CHEs), complex contingency operations, peace 
enforcement, and warfare (quadrant 4). Each presents diff erent 
coordination challenges.
Interaction potential between 
the military and civilians . . . 
is limited because of their 
mutual suspicions. Th ese derive 
from a host of factors such as a 
perceived lack of common goals 
and values between the military 
and civilian organizations, 
as well as the absence of a 
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Figure 1 Civilian and Military Operations under Varying 
Conditions of Threat and Domain Consensus
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Peacekeeping is defi ned as the use of military and civilian personnel 
to separate combatants, police demilitarized zones, and monitor 
cease fi res after they have been negotiated and accepted by all 
belligerents (Jett 2000). Th e general threat level is reduced 
because a ceasefi res has been accepted by all parties, although a 
potential threat remains if the combatants do not maintain their 
agreements. Domain consensus, however, remains high for both 
the military and civilians who monitor agreements. Both operate 
under restricted “rules of engagement,” and both have their 
specifi c duties and responsibilities: civilians monitor the ceasefi res 
and elections, and the military keeps former combatants separated 
and polices the demilitarized zones. Th e challenges of IOCs in 
these cases result from “mission creep,” when 
the goals of operations are redefi ned and 
expanded, thus requiring the renegotiation of 
the rules of engagement for both civilians 
and the military. Examples of peacekeeping 
operations include UN interventions into 
Cyprus and the Golan Heights (Jett 2000).
Disaster relief refers to any response to 
natural disasters and environmental 
emergencies that pose threats to human life 
(Auf der Heide 1989). Th ey can range from 
low to high levels of threat depending on 
their scale. However, military involvement 
in disaster relief tends to occur when the 
threat levels are high and calamities overwhelm the ability of 
civilian responders to provide immediate care. In terms of domain 
consensus, civilian and military organizations generally agree 
that their missions are similar: to provide emergency food, water, 
shelter, and medical care to those in need. Although both the 
military and civilians end up working in the same humanitarian 
space, friction points tend to be fewer because both acknowledge 
their mutual dependencies and the complementarity of their 
eff orts. Th e military contributes transportation, “lift,” and 
advanced communication and information technology; civilians 
provide in-depth cultural and historical knowledge and functional 
expertise in disaster relief. Th us, as organization theory predicts, 
“signifi cant diff erences between organizations’ outputs . . . 
reduce the potential for main disagreements between them, and 
increase their chances of mutual involvement in IOC” 
(Alexander 1995, 20).
Th e third type of civ-mil operations—postconfl ict reconstruction 
and development operations—is defi ned by the United Nations 
as peacebuilding operations, by the U.S. military as stabilization, 
security, transition, and reconstruction operations (DOD 2005), and 
as nation building (Dobbins et al. 2003; Dobbins et al. 2007). 
Others have referred to these activities as “fourth-generation 
peacekeeping” or “complex peacekeeping” (Rittberger 2007). 
Activities include the following:
Security: peacekeeping, rule of law, law enforcement, and 
security sector reform
Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and provision of 
medical care, food, and shelter





Economic stabilization: establishment of a stable currency and 
a legal and regulatory framework for the resumption of local and 
international commerce
Democratization: creation of political parties, free press, civil 
society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
Development: economic growth, poverty reduction, and infra-
structure improvements (Dobbins et al. 2007, xxiii)
As major combat subsides, one would expect the domain 
confl icts between military and civilian organizations to lessen. 
Th is can be the outcome, as nation-building exercises in Bosnia 
and Kosovo demonstrated (Dobbins et al. 2003). However, 
despite the offi  cial endings of war, U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq still 
activate domain confl icts between civilian 
and military organizations. Several factors 
contribute to the ongoing tensions. First, 
in military terms, Afghanistan and Iraq are 
considered nonpermissive environments 
where military forces in country are still 
engaged as combatants. Even though 
operations (until recently under President 
Barack Obama) transitioned from major 
combat to stabilization, friction between 
military and civilian organizations exists 
around the same key issues activated during 
CHEs and warfare: information sharing 
and securing a humanitarian space. Development space is also 
contested when military organizations engage in civic action 
projects such as building schools and medical clinics, although 
those involved in reconstruction and development appear to be 
“less wedded to the concepts of independence and impartiality” 
(Dziedzic and Seidel 2005, 6). Even new coordination mechanisms 
to assist in stabilization and reconstruction, such as the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq, are 
contentious.
Th e PRTs combine military and civilian personnel from various 
government agencies, as well as diplomats and specialists in economic 
development, stabilization, and reconstruction activities (Dziedzic 
and Seidel 2005; Perito 2007). To accomplish their mission, they 
interact with regional political, military, and community leaders 
and sponsor various civic engagement and reconstruction projects 
(Dobbins et al. 2003). Despite their many contributions, however, 
questions have arisen about the ability of PRTs to establish security 
in the medium and long run. Many ask, “Does the use of military 
resources to fi ll the void in civilian humanitarian assistance result 
in the pacifi cation of hostile territory more eff ectively than using 
military resources exclusively to establish a secure environment 
so that civilian relief and reconstruction eff orts can fl ourish?” 
(Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, 7). Development NGOs and international 
organizations (IOs) also have raised strong objections to PRTs; 
they see them as the expansion of the military’s role into their 
development space, challenging their areas of comparative advantage. 
In response, the military sees the PRTs as born of the unstable 
situation in Afghanistan and the changing nature of warfare, where 
insurgents and terrorists view anyone aligned with the Afghan 
government as the enemy, including humanitarian and development 
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More serious domain confl icts surfaced with the publication of the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s Directive 3000.05 (DOD 2005). 
Th e U.S. military now has a new mandate—support for stability, 
security, transition, and reconstruction—in addition to its traditional 
mandate of combat operations. Once stability is restored to an area, 
or even during large-scale combat operations, the military’s short-
term goal is to reestablish essential services and meet humanitarian 
needs. Its long-term goal is to develop indigenous capacity for 
ensuring essential services, a market economy, the rule of law, 
democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. With this new 
directive, “stability operations [have become] a core U.S. military 
mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. 
Th ey [are] given priority comparable to combat operations and 
[are] explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities 
including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, 
materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning” (2).
Th e promulgation of this new directive sent shock waves through 
the civilian community. Although it states that operational tasks are 
best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professions, 
U.S. military forces are now to perform all tasks when civilians 
cannot do so. Tasks include rebuilding indigenous institutions, 
including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; 
reviving or rebuilding the private sector to include encouragement 
of citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and the construction 
of the necessary state infrastructure; and the development of 
representative government institutions (Counterinsurgency 2006). 
From the perspective of civilian organizations, 3000.05 moves 
directly into their reconstruction and development space. Th us, 
military organizations are now pitted against a new set of actors—
the civilian reconstruction and development organizations that 
challenge the military’s expanding roles into civil society.
Finally, domain confl icts are high in quadrant 4, as are the threat 
levels that both confront. As alluded to earlier, various terms are 
used to describe these operations: multidimensional peacekeeping 
(second-generation peacekeeping) and robust peacekeeping (third-
generation peacekeeping) (Rittberger 2007), complex humanitarian 
emergencies; complex contingency operations; or complex peace 
operations that often require peace enforcement (Byman et al. 2000; 
Pirnie 1998). Unlike natural disasters such as earthquakes or fl oods, 
these operations occur in “a country, region or society where there 
is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from 
internal or external confl ict” (IASC 2004, 5). Th ey often result in 
massive numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, gross 
violations of human rights, and large-scale disruption of people’s 
livelihoods. Th us, the forcible restoration of peace without the 
consent of the parties in the armed confl ict, or peace enforcement, 
as in the no-fl y zones in Iraq and Bosnia, is characteristic of 
quadrant 4 operations.
During the early stages of CHEs, emergency relief in the form 
of food, water, and shelter is a priority, yet its distribution can be 
hampered because of a lack of security and a supportive government 
or social infrastructure. Th us, interventions require both a civilian 
and a military component. Th e civilian component has a large 
contingent of humanitarian relief organizations populated by 
NGOs and IOs whose purpose is to relieve human suff ering and 
“to protect the human rights of victims of violence, persecution, 
and other misfortunes” (Sommers 2000, 99). Aid is provided on the 
basis of need, with a commitment to “do no harm” (IASC 2004). In 
addition, NGOs and IOs may engage in a variety of humanitarian 
tasks, including confl ict resolution and reconciliation eff orts, 
capacity building, and mobilization of international support for 
action in confl ict areas. Depending on the intervention, the military 
component could be composed of UN, regional (e.g., NATO), and/
or national security forces (e.g., U.S. military) (Byman et al. 2000; 
Pirnie and Francisco 1998; White House 1997; USIP 2000).
Apart from taking a more coercive role in disarming adversaries, 
restoring public order, demobilizing and reintegrating former 
combatants, and enforcing peace agreements, the military also 
supports and facilitates civilian activities: the distribution of 
assistance; the provision of safety for refugees, displaced persons, 
and civilian NGOs and IOs; the protection of relief supplies in 
unstable situations by securing warehouses, convoy routes, and 
distribution points; and the provision of logistical expertise to 
civilian organizations. Depending on the mission, the military also 
may work with civilians in demining, reuniting divided societies, 
organizing elections, and promoting representative governments and 
economic growth (Dobbins et al. 2007).
Lesson 3: To understand the challenges, choices, and 
opportunities for civ-mil coordination, practitioners and 
researchers need to pay attention to the temporal coincidence 
or sequencing of humanitarian and military operations in any 
given theater of operation.
Th e temporal coincidence of security operations and assistance 
complicates IOC for both civilian and military organizations, 
as occurred in Somalia, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
Kosovo, where humanitarian interventions occurred at the same 
time as military operations (Oliker et al. 2004; Studer 2001). At 
the heart of confl ict is the issue of “humanitarian space” (Studer 
2001; Whelan and Harmer 2006). To have access to those in need, 
civilian organizations must be able to “cross the ‘lines’ of confl ict,” 
which in contemporary warfare are fl uid and vary over time 
(Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, 6). Being associated with any one of the 
combatant parties puts them and those they are attempting to help 
at risk. Th e safest action in this situation is to avoid any association 
with belligerents. Th erefore, the goal for civilian organizations is 
to establish and preserve a neutral, impartial “humanitarian space” 
in which to work safely and eff ectively without undue interference 
from combatants or governments during peace operations (Dziedzic 
and Seidl 2005; IASC 2004; Oliker et al. 2004; Whelan and 
Harmer 2006).
Even civilian humanitarians within the UN system take pains to 
distance themselves from UN-sanctioned military actions, noting 
that “whenever we are associated with political strategies, we 
increase our own vulnerabilities and risk” (Reindorp and Wiles 
2001, 44). If the distribution of aid, which humanitarians consider 
to be a civilian task, is militarized, it “blurs the boundaries” between 
military and civilian organizations and heightens security risks by 
turning humanitarian facilities and staff  into perceived enemies and 
ultimately into targets (Bessler and Seki 2006; Dobbin et al. 2007; 
Whelan and Harmer 2006). For example, the attempt to apprehend 
the warlord Mohammed Aideed in Somalia was viewed by his 
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supporters as the United States and the United Nations taking sides 
in the confl ict. NGOs believed their neutrality was compromised by 
these actions and ultimately led to armed militias’ attacks on World 
Vision personnel as an expression of displeasure with the U.S.-led 
enforcement action (Abiew 2003).
Lesson 4: While the military sees NGOs and IOs as “force 
multipliers” (a reality that they resent), NGOs and IOs see the 
military as trying to “politicize humanitarianism” (a reality that 
they resent).
Civilians also resist and resent the military’s attempts to treat them 
as a “force multiplier” for the purpose of “winning hearts and 
minds” (Oliker et al. 2004; Tomb 2005). During an insurgency, for 
example, the military may provide support to displaced civilians and 
initiate civic action projects in order to cultivate popular support 
among the locals, increase force protection, and ultimately reduce 
the overall threat level in the area (Counterinsurgency 2006). 
NGOs in particular have serious concerns about being co-opted 
into a military strategy and inadvertently becoming pawns in a 
“politicization of humanitarianism” (James 2003; Reindorp and 
Wiles 2001; Studer 2001; Whelan and Harmer 2006).
For the military, humanitarian aid dispensed during a confl ict is 
not a neutral act (Seiple 1996). It can sustain a confl ict because 
the combatants, as well as their supporters who receive aid, are 
reinforced rather than weakened. Th e military cites civilian 
diffi  culties in disentangling assistance from the political objectives 
of governments and warring factions, which aff ects their ability to 
be perceived as neutral actors in Afghanistan. Th e military notes 
that despite their intentions, “NGOs were perceived by Afghans 
generally and by the Taliban in particular as partisan” (Oliker et al. 
2004, 37).
In addition, given the tensions between military and civilian 
organizations over what constitutes security, as well as the number 
and diversity of civilian organizations, security in the humanitarian 
space is diffi  cult to establish. Th e UN-affi  liated Union of 
International Associations recognizes more than 14,500 diff erent 
international NGOs (Jett 2000). Not all appear in the same 
operations, but reports indicate that some 1,700 NGOs were active 
in Bosnia (Pollick 2000, 59), and more than 800 are registered 
to work in Afghanistan (Tomb 2005). Moreover, these fi gures do 
not take into account those operating without the consent of the 
governing authority, all of which makes coordination complex. 
Civilian organizations also tend to be independent and widely 
dispersed geographically. Each has its own specifi c area of expertise, 
and each competes with others for funding and for media coverage 
to attract more funds (Abiew 2003; Cooley and Ron 2002; Oliker 
et al. 2004; Reindorp and Wiles 2001). Under these circumstances, 
it is diffi  cult for civilians to coordinate with one another to establish 
humanitarian space, let alone coordinate as a whole with military 
organizations (Donini 2000; Eisenhour and Marks 1999).
Also located in quadrant 4, warfare produces the highest levels of 
threat in the environment and the highest level of domain confl ict 
between civilian and military organizations, especially when the 
military is one of the combatants. In this case, battle space is 
diffi  cult to establish, and combatants may be unwilling or unable 
to provide civilians with a safe and secure environment. In fact, 
civilians may become a primary target that belligerents, through 
intimidation, coercion, and brutality, use to achieve their objectives.
Under these conditions, force protection becomes a high priority 
for the military. It is reluctant to share operational information 
about deployments or capabilities with civilian organizations, many 
of whom the military does not know given their vast numbers 
and diversity, for fear of endangering the troops. A great deal of 
information, such as maps and terrain data previously shared, 
even data submitted by civilians, becomes classifi ed, creating 
additional friction (Oliker et al. 2004). In turn, and although 
they are forthcoming with information concerning the needs of 
suff ering people, civilian organizations, particularly NGOs, are 
reluctant to share sensitive information, fearing that it might 
jeopardize their access to crisis areas. Th is makes their ability to gain 
information about the changing security environment, the location 
of unexploded ordnance, and any major population movements 
precipitated by combat operations more diffi  cult to obtain.
Lesson 5: Civ-mil relations are likely to deteriorate during 
warfare when the military engages in humanitarian eff orts.
Domain confl ict reaches a high point when a situation is deemed to 
be too dangerous for civilians to continue their work, so the military 
steps in to dispense humanitarian aid. Th e military now assumes a 
dual role—combatant and provider of humanitarian assistance, as it 
did in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor and Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan. In this situation, coordination becomes 
“a complicated and vexing matter in an environment where the 
UN and NGO community fear that association with one of the 
combatant forces imperil[s] its perceived neutrality, increase[s] 
the security threat, and limit[s] its subsequent ability to accomplish 
its missions over the longer term” (Oliker et al. 2004, 82). When 
some civil aff airs military units put on civilian clothes to distribute 
aid—what some viewed as a violation of previously established 
agreements between military and civilian organizations—relations 
reached their low point (InterAction 2002). Th e blurred lines 
between military and civilian organizations apparent during 
CHEs (Whelan and Harmer 2006) became “bleeding boundaries” 
in warfare (Phelan and Wood 2005), with domain consensus 
becoming another casualty of war.
Interorganizational Theory, Administrative Constraints, 
and the Civilian-Military Nexus
Certainly, increasing linkages between and among organizations 
have their advantages, as studies in other policy arenas have 
documented (e.g., Alter and Hage 1993; Huxham and Vongen 
2005; Provan and Milward 1995). But tighter connections among 
organizations also have their challenges. Greater connectivity among 
organizations can increase their interdependencies (Alexander 1985; 
Gray 1985, 1989; Luke 1991; Pfeff er and Salancik 1978; Scott 
2003). Th ese interdependencies, in turn, have to be managed if 
interorganizational relationships are to be maintained (Alexander 
1995; Hatch 1997).
Given the mix of organizational characteristics, coordinating costs, 
and interaction potential in IOCs, organizations consider a range 
of coordination mechanisms and choose those that they perceive fi t 
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the situation and its requirements (Alexander 
1995). In the case of civilian and military 
organizations, experimentation has been 
under way for some time as organizations 
have struggled to move beyond the “blight 
of adhocracy” (Reindorp and Wiles 2001, 
50), which many agree is an unsatisfactory 
condition in which organizations operate 
without regard to others in their domain. 
Finding the right balance between self-
interests and domain interests is a delicate 
maneuver, however, as each organization 
seeks mechanisms that enable it to coordinate with others and yet 
not be coordinated by others. As one person put it, “You’ve got to 
work closely together and keep your distance” (Reindorp and 
Wiles 2001, 46).
Lesson 6: Mechanisms for coordinating civ-mil relations during 
theater operations are similar to those identifi ed by Galbraith in 
his intraorganizational information-processing approach, and 
each has run into formidable constraints on eff ectiveness.
Although Galbraith’s (1973) information-processing approach 
to coordination focuses on intraorganizational coordination, it 
nonetheless provides a useful framework to examine coordination 
mechanisms used in civ-mil relations. Galbraith identifi es fi ve 
diff erent coordination strategies: rules and programs, hierarchy, 
goal and targets, reduction of the need to process information, and 
increased capacity to process information laterally.
Applying Galbraith’s model of information processing and 
coordination to civ-mil relations, we fi nd that all of his strategies have 
been attempted to date, at least to some extent. Standard operating 
procedures are evident in the attempts to establish “rules” to govern 
humanitarian space. But as we saw with changes in the threat levels 
after the Cold War, the rules of humanitarian space have been 
challenged, straining civ-mil relations. When eff orts to reaffi  rm rules 
are inadequate, as Galbraith would predict, the organizations involved 
then turn to hierarchy as a mechanism of coordination. One example 
is the United Nation’s experiment with the Strategic Framework, an 
eff ort to create a top-down mechanism to coordinate all in-country 
organizations in Afghanistan. Although it did have some limited 
success (Roberts and Bradley 2005), it was discontinued after its 
second attempt to employ this tactic in Sierra Leone failed to integrate 
political (which includes military), humanitarian, and development 
strategies.
Even when there has been a political consensus—for example, 
when a UN resolution authorizing peace operations is signed by 
major civilian and military organizations—the weak international 
authority structure makes it diffi  cult to rely on a single hierarchical 
chain of command as a mechanism of coordination. Th ere is no 
one authority that all IOs, governments, and NGOs acknowledge. 
Even the special representatives of the secretary-general, nominally 
the head of UN missions in country, do not exercise direct control 
over independent heads of such UN agencies as the resident 
representative of the United Nations Development Programme or 
the humanitarian coordinator of the Offi  ce for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Aff airs, much less over NGOs or military forces.
So without agreement on hierarchical 
authority, Galbraith’s third coordination 
strategy is also constrained. Th ere is no 
leadership that is able to establish goals 
and targets to guide all intervention eff orts. 
Vertical information transfers likewise suff er 
from the same limitations of hierarchy and 
goal and target setting. Without agreement on 
an overarching authority, no one can initiate, 
develop, and implement a vertical information 
system for the purpose of integrating all 
civilian and military organizations in any 
given theater. Each organization tends to have its own system and 
limits access to others (Holohan 2005).
Galbraith’s fourth strategy—the reduction of the need to process 
information—is used by both military and civilian organizations. 
It involves two options, and each has its constraints. First, 
organizations can lower the number of exceptions with which 
they have to contend by reducing their expected performance 
levels. For example, they can allow for extra time and resources 
to work together. Th ey can be more accepting of delays in 
information processing between and among organizations. 
Th ey can be willing to tolerate budget overruns as a result of 
coordination problems. Of course, these examples of slack 
increase costs and reduce overall system effi  ciency, potentially 
eroding eff ectiveness as benefi ts to needy people decline. 
Alternatively, organizations simply can decouple their activities 
from other organizations and attempt to operate as autonomous 
entities. Either because of confl icting mandates or because they 
fi nd the transaction costs in dealing with other organizations too 
high, they can ignore or refuse to work with other organizations 
in the human security domain, with human security becoming 
less than it could be.
Th e remaining strategy in Galbraith’s typology—the creation 
of lateral relations—appears to be the most widely recognized 
mechanism of information processing and coordination. Direct 
contacts are prevalent where organizations operate without formal 
lateral mechanisms to orchestrate concerted action. In this case, 
coordination ends up being reliant on informal, ad hoc, and 
personal relationships among organizational members who are 
forced to discover and renegotiate all of their connections afresh at 
the onset of each international intervention, often with uncertain 
results (Donini 1996; Reindorp and Wiles 2001; Sommers 2000). 
As noted by Reindorp and Wiles in their humanitarian coordination 
study, “Th e ‘system’ shows determined resistance to cede authority 
to anyone or any structure,” producing a “blight of adhocracy” 
(2001, 50) or what Donini (1996) describes as “coordination by 
default.”
Liaison roles, individual positions created to link specifi c 
organizations, are evidenced by the civ-mil liaison offi  cers who are 
appointed to handle interorganizational contacts and coordination. 
Task forces and teams also are prevalent, as demonstrated in the 
Integrated Mission Task Forces, the Civil-Military Operations 
Task Force, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Examples 
of new organizational units include the UN On-Site Operations 
Coordination Center, Civil-Military Operations Centers, 
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Humanitarian Operations Centers, and the Afghanistan NGO 
Security Offi  ce. But these, too, are hardly panaceas, as some civilian 
organizations opt out when military personnel are involved for fear 
of compromising their neutrality.
Toward Communities of Practice? Preliminary Lessons 
from the Front Lines
Although the preceding has chronicled a variety of formal 
coordination mechanisms and their constraints, there are 
important undercurrents beneath the formal level that also must be 
acknowledged in civ-mil relations. Surfacing in all four quadrants 
are communities of practice (COPs)—“groups of people who share 
a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who 
deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on 
an ongoing basis” (Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002, 4).
Lesson 7: Self-emergent hubs—or communities of practice—are 
promising ways to avoid coordination constraints. Th ey bring 
civilians and the military together to identify, exchange, and 
institutionalize best practices that exist across all four types 
of civ-mil operations. However, much remains before these 
communities of practice can say with certainty what works, what 
does not, and under what conditions.
Examples of COPs can be grouped within the four general types 
of civ-mil operations outlined in fi gure 1. Peacekeeping hubs 
attract those interested in training and preparation for upcoming 
assignments. Th ese include eff orts by the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre. Likewise, the Hawaii Center for Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance and the Asia Pacifi c Peace 
Operations Capacity Building Program gather civilians from federal 
governments, UN personnel, civilian police, and international and 
nongovernmental agencies. Together with military personnel, they 
practice dealing with the complexities of peace operations. Th e U.S. 
Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute also off ers 
peace operations training and education for mid- to senior-level 
audiences, including U.S. military services, interagency programs, 
civilian organizations, foreign militaries, and IOs/NGOs.
Similar hubs exist for disaster relief. Th ese include the UN’s Offi  ce 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff airs and AlertNet, 
sponsored by the Reuters Foundation. Th ese programs aff ord 
access to documents, articles, and links to sites on topics such 
as satellite images, children and war, working in relief, refugees, 
and technology. Another good example of emergent COPs are 
the Strong Angel exercises. Originally sponsored by a small 
group of interested civilian and military personnel, Strong 
Angel demonstrations experiment with the use of cutting-edge 
techniques and technologies to facilitate improved information 
fl ow and cooperation related to disaster relief across the civ-mil 
boundary.
COPs also are emerging around stabilization and reconstruction 
issues. One example is the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies, a teaching institute located at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. It provides 
educational opportunities for the full spectrum of actors—U.S. 
and international armed forces, government civilian agencies, and 
representatives from NGOs and IOs—all of whom are involved in 
worldwide stabilization and reconstruction activities. Practitioner-
oriented programs include games/table-top exercises, short courses, 
workshops, conferences, and applied research initiatives on topics 
such as security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration, cross-cultural understanding, information sharing, 
and skill development in collaboration and negotiation. Likewise, 
the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., an 
independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and 
funded by Congress, supports policy makers by providing analyses, 
policy options, and advice, including the sponsorship of country-
oriented working groups such as the Iraq Study Group and the Task 
Force on the United Nations.
Th ere also is a growing number of COPs within the development 
area. Th e United States Institute of Peace has been a major hub 
in bringing together civilian and military organizations to address 
IOC challenges concerning complex emergencies. It has launched a 
series of eff orts to improve information sharing and the designs of 
new information management and planning capabilities involving 
humanitarian relief, human rights, and militaries engaged in 
complex emergencies. Its latest endeavor has been to develop new 
guidelines to mitigate civ-mil frictions and to preserve humanitarian 
space in high-confl ict environments in places such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq (USIP 2007).
Still, we need to be realistic in our expectations regarding the role 
of COPs in civ-mil IOCs. Challenges will not be resolved anytime 
soon. Some organizations, as a matter of principle, will not work 
together. Tensions will continue between militaries and many 
civilian organizations given their numbers and divergent interests. 
As Oliker and his associates have noted, “[d]octrine and training 
alone cannot change this. Doctrine and training can, however, 
help the various actors better understand each other’s roles and 
capabilities and can thus enable them to be more eff ective when 
working in the same theater” (2004, 111).
Lesson 8: While challenges to civ-mil coordination will always 
exist, success through communities of practice is more likely 
whenever low-threat conditions exist, when relations are lateral 
rather than hierarchical, and when participants embrace their 
dual identity status and do not hoard information and limit 
communication and innovation.
As documented earlier, there have been some successes with 
various formal coordination mechanisms in alleviating tensions 
between civ-mil organizations—especially under low-threat 
conditions during peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. And 
following Galbraith’s (1973) information-processing framework, 
we fi nd lateral forms of coordination preferable to vertical forms 
of coordination. Th is is especially true when organizations do 
not acknowledge the authority of any one entity to oversee 
all organizations and when neither the degradation of IOC 
performance nor adhocracy is viewed as a feasible alternative. 
Organizations involved in complex emergencies and stabilization 
and reconstruction operations also have been working to establish 
“rules of engagement” in order to facilitate interactions.
Still, developing COPs will also require time, resources, and 
patience (Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder 2002, chap. 3). 
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As Wenger and his colleagues note, COPs “can hoard knowledge, 
limit innovation, and hold others hostages to their expertise” (2002, 
139). Practitioners will also have to negotiate dual identities as 
members of the community and as members of an organization 
(Wenger 1998), and these role confl icts are likely to exacerbate 
the already serious domain confl icts that exist. Size will be a factor 
as well; it is unlikely that all organizations in the human security 
domain could be core participants.
An Agenda for Future Research on the Civilian-Military 
Nexus
Th e use of coordination mechanisms, 
both formal and informal, off ers reasons for 
optimism, but the paucity of IOC theory 
provides little guidance to practitioners on 
what mechanisms are appropriate under 
which conditions. We need better theory 
to guide actions in this important arena. 
Th e two-by-two matrix of the human 
security domain that identifi es four general 
types of civ-mil operations is a beginning. 
Empirical assessment of the coordination 
mechanisms used for each type of operation, 
such as the evaluations of the PRTs (Dziedzic 
and Seidl 2005; Perito 2007), is clearly 
needed.
Researchers also might build on Galbraith’s 
information-processing theory to explore 
the conditions under which diff erent 
coordination mechanisms are utilized in the 
four quadrants. For example, if tasks are well 
understood, the domain consensus is high, and environmental 
threats are lower, as they are in classical peacekeeping in quadrant 
1, then task coordination would more likely be preplanned. 
Under these conditions, we would expect to fi nd greater reliance 
on routines, best practices, and “rules of engagement” for IOC. 
When the threat level is high (quadrants 2 and 3) and the domain 
confl icts are high (quadrants 3 and 4), we would expect greater task 
uncertainty. Th is, in turn, means greater amounts of information 
that organizational members must process during task execution 
to determine what needs to be done, by whom, when, and how. 
Based on this reasoning, researchers should expect to fi nd a greater 
range and number of IOC mechanisms under warfare conditions as 
compared to relief operations, complex contingency operations, or 
stabilization and reconstruction eff orts. It is also likely that at some 
point a growing number of coordination mechanisms would overtax 
and overwhelm people’s ability to understand and use them. Should 
that condition obtain, they would become part of the “coordination 
nightmare” rather than a solution to it.
Researchers also could anticipate the relationships between task 
uncertainties, levels of information processing, and the choice of 
IOC coordination mechanisms to be mediated by organizational 
successes in these operations. Galbraith notes that “task information 
requirements and the capacity of the organization to process 
information are always matched. If the organization does not 
consciously match them, reduced performance through budget 
overruns or schedule overruns will occur in order to bring out equality” 
(1973, 19). Translating this proposition to IOC, we would expect 
coordination to be mediated by member organizations’ abilities to 
match their task information requirements and their abilities to process 
information. If they are not consciously matched, if organizations 
are unable or unwilling to evolve diff erent strategies to process the 
greater amount of information necessary to maintain their level of 
performance, then costs are likely to increase and performance is likely 
to decline. Th is would be the case not only for the organization, but 
also for the human security domain as a whole. Follow-up studies to 
test these propositions are needed, as are additional studies informed 
by competing theories of IOC such as resource dependence theory 
(Pfeff er and Salancik 1978), transaction cost theory (Williamson 
1995), and social network theory (Chisholm 
1989; Powell 1990).
In-depth studies of the various COPs 
surfacing around the themes of peacekeeping, 
disaster relief, stabilization and reconstruction, 
and complex humanitarian emergencies are 
also needed to provide insights into their 
long-term viability in the human security 
domain. A central issue for future research 
is whether these nascent communities 
will evolve into more formal network 
organizations and emerge as a possible 
alternative to other forms of organizing, such 
as hierarchies and markets (Anklam 2007). 
COPs may only be a temporary way station 
until organizations resolve some of their 
outstanding coordination issues. Alternatively, 
they might be one of the few viable options 
when hierarchy is not politically feasible and 
market-like interorganizational transactions are inadequate. Th is 
typically occurs when coping with complex political and operational 
interdependencies and maintaining accountability for organizational 
and individual performance.
Th us, research that compares and contrasts alternative forms of 
organizing in the human security domain would be of great benefi t. 
For example, it would be important for all organizations, not just 
civilian and military organizations, to establish whether COPs have 
a place on the organizing continuum and off er important advantages 
over markets and hierarchies. Relatedly, how should organizations 
be selected to participate in COPs (Wenger, McDermott, and 
Snyder, 2002)? Would it be possible to develop diff erent degrees 
of participation in COPs without alienating some organizations? 
Would it be feasible for a core group of organizations operating in 
all four quadrants to become a COP for the human security domain 
as a whole rather than relying on multiple, overlapping communities 
that focus on subsets of issues and problems within the domain? If 
so, which organizations would serve in that capacity, and what steps 
should they pursue to build an overarching COP to ensure collective 
learning for the domain as a whole?
Finally, research attention should be given to small-scale NGOs 
in the human security domain that are market-based and touted 
to be more fl exible compared to traditional humanitarian and 
development organizations. Th ey have prompted serious questions 
of accountability that have yet to be resolved, and their claims 
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remain largely undocumented (e.g., Abiew 2003; Singer 2006). Also 
prompting serious questions are the private military companies and 
their forces that provide services in lieu of government-run militaries 
(Singer 2006). Th eir personnel operate in a legal gray area with 
“little or no supervision” except what their individual fi rms provide. 
Th ey are not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, in 
Iraq, are exempt from prosecution for crimes committed in country 
(Singer 2006).
Regardless of the specifi cs and bounds of any research agenda 
pursued, public administration scholarship on the domain confl icts 
between military and civilian organizations and their resultant 
coordination challenges is badly needed and long overdue. Th is 
essay is off ered in the spirit of early public administration scholars 
steeped deeply in eff orts to improve governance while simultaneously 
improving the science and art of their discipline through rigorous 
research. I urge our fi eld to take up this signifi cant research challenge 
in the years ahead to improve both practice and theory building.
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